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NOTES
FINANCE LEASE, HELL OR HIGH WATER CLAUSE,
AND THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY THEORY
IN ARTICLE 2A OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
In promulgating Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) in 1987,1 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute sought to es-
tablish a comprehensive statutory regime to govern the formation,
performance, and enforcement of leases of personal property in
both commercial and consumer settings. 2 Historically the leasing of
personal property has been subject to many elements of statutory
and common law, including principles drawn by analogy from ex-
isting parts of the U.C.C. 3 Specifically, the drafters of Article 2A
1 SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 202-304 (West 1987), as amended by Amend-
ments to Uniform Commercial Code Articles [sic] 2A Leases (National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws 1990). All subsequent references are to the 1991 text of
the statute unless indicated otherwise. For background on Article 2A, see generally
JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2A LEASES
OF GOODS 2-4 (3d ed. 1991); Peter A. Alces, Surreptitious and Not-so-Surreptitious Adjustment
of the UCC: An Introductory Essay, 39 ALA. L. REV. 559 (1988); Amelia H. Boss, The History
of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988); Edwin
E. Huddleston, III, Old Wine in New Bottles: Article 2A-Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 615 (1988);
Homer Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes about Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 791 (1988); Harry C.
Sigman &Jeffrey S. Turner, Preface to the California Report on Article 2A (With Some Thoughts
About Participation in the Legislative Process), 39 ALA. L. REx'. 975 (1988). For discussion
concerning finance leases in Article 2A, see Gregory Naples, A Review and Analysis of the
New Article 2A-Leases Amendment to the UCC and Its Impact on Secured Creditors, Equipment and
Finance Lessors, 93 COM. LJ. 342 (1988). For a discussion of the priority of liens under
Article 2A, see Linda L. Boss, Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2A-Leases: Structur-
ing Priorities of Competing Claimants to Leased Property, 73 MINN. L. REv. 208 (1988).
2 SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES, supra note 1, at 205-06. Article 2A does not
address leases of real property, because it defines "lease" as "a transfer of the right to
possession and use of goods for a term. U.C.C. § 2A-103(I)(j) (1991) (emphasis
added). "Goods" are
all things that are movable at the time of identification to the lease con-
tract, or are fixtures (Section 2A-309), but the term does not include
money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general in-
tangibles, or minerals or the like, including oil and gas, before extraction.
The term also includes the unborn young of animals.
Id. § 2A-103(l)(h).
3 As of this writing, Article 2A has been enacted in 12 states: California, Florida,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming.
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relied heavily on Articles 2 and 9,4 which had close application to
leasing transactions; and the great majority of Article 2A's provi-
sions are based on these sections. 5
There is, however, an important type of leasing transaction that
resists codification under principles derived from the U.C.C.: the
"finance lease."6 A finance lease differs fundmentally from the bi-
lateral transactions which form the basic subject matter of both Arti-
cles 2 and 2A. A finance lease involves three parties: a lessor, a
lessee, and a supplier,7 each of whom must meet certain specific
conditions. 8 With three parties present, and two contracts (one be-
tween supplier and lessor, denominated the "supply contract,"9 and
4 These Articles address sales and secured transactions respectively. In addition,
one of the basic provisions concerning finance leases, § 2A-209, draws on §§ 302-315 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). U.C.C. § 2A-209 official cmt. (1991).
See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. The official comments state that, owing to
the greater similarity of the lease transaction to a sale of goods, rather than a secured
transaction, Article 2 of the U.C.C. provided the main analogue for Article 2A. Id § 2A-
101 official cmt. The factors in this determination included the fact that parties to a
lease, unlike those in a secured transaction, are often not represented by counsel, and
that leases, like sales, involve bilateral obligations among the parties. Id Finance
leases, however, more closely resemble secured transactions than do "ordinary" bilat-
eral leases. A conforming amendment to § 1-201(37) of the U.C.C., defining security
interests, was promulgated along with Article 2A in 1987. Its purpose was to "sharpen(]
the distinction between leases and security interests disguised as leases." Id § 1-
201(37) official cmt. (1987). The result of the amendment is that the chief characteristic
of a "true" lease, as opposed to a security interest, will be the presence of an economi-
cally meaningful residual interest held by the lessor at the end of the lease term. An
important reason for developing Article 2A was to solidify, on a statutory basis, the
distinction between the "true" lease and security interests disguised as leases. Id § 2A-
101 official cmt. (discussing differences regarding filing requirements between secured
transactions and leases, and also the source of warranty obligations-Article 2 for sales,
of uncertain provenance to leases); WnIT & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 5-18. For a dis-
cussion of the distinction between leases and security interests before Article 2A, see
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 21-23 (3d ed.
1988).
5 This reliance is duly noted in the official comments to these provisions. In addi-
tion, the drafters note that "the official comments to those sections of Article 2 whose
provisions were carried over [to Article 2A] are incorporated by reference in Article
2A." U.C.C. § 2A-101 official cmt. (1987).
6 Finance leases are also sometimes known as equipment leases. In addition, the
term "finance lease" may have trade meanings not covered by the U.C.C. statutory defi-
nition of the term.
7 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) (1991).
8 These are contained in § 2A-103(g). See infra notes 19-33 and accompanying
text. For the text of § 2A-103(l)(g), see infra note 12.
9 " 'Supply contract' means a contract under which a lessor buys or leases goods to
be leased." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(y) (1991).
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one between lessor and lessee, the "lease contract"' 0 ), the sequence
of events leading to contract formation can be quite varied.I
The absence of a structural analogue to finance leases in the
U.C.C. prompted Article 2A's drafters to include specific provisions
relating to finance leases. This was particularly necessary in the
context of warranty and lessee obligations, because the finance
leases follow a widely divergent pattern from the typical bilateral
lease. In the latter type of transaction, where only a lessor and
lessee are present, Article 2 provided a ready model. However, for
the finance lease, no comparable model existed.
Article 2A contains three major provisions detailing the charac-
teristics of, and obligations, under a finance lease. First, section 2A-
10 "'Lease contract' means the total legal obligation that results from the lease
agreement as affected by this Article and any other applicable rules of law. Unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, the term inludes a sublease contract." Id. § 2A-
103(1)(1).
11 For example, a finance lease can be created by direct negotiations between the
lessee and supplier, with the lessor adopting a limited role in the transaction, or by a
"sale-leaseback" arrangement, where the supplier's involvement in the lease becomes
more remote.
Typically, the lessee, as a potential user of the goods (say, a moving company inter-
ested in some trucks), will approach a supplier directly (this could be a truck manufac-
turer, for example). The potential lessee will negotiate the terms of a sale, including any
warranties or other preferred terms, and will then execute a purchase order with the
supplier. The lessee will then seek a finance lessor, typically a bank or financing com-
pany, which will assume the purchase order. When the lessee finds a suitable lessor, it
assigns the purchase order to the lessor, which in turn executes a lease of the trucks to
the lessee. The finance lessor never takes physical possession of the trucks. These are
delivered directly to the lessee by the supplier. Thus, the lessor's role is limited to exe-
cuting the paperwork and supplying the funds necessary to the purchase, and subse-
quent lease, of the trucks. Id § 2A-103(l)(g) official cmt.
Another method of creating a finance lease-one where the supplier might not be
so closely involved during the lease negotiations-is through formation of a so-called
sale-leaseback arrangement. See Albert F. Reisman, Drafting and Negotiating the Equipment
Lease, in EQuIPMENT LyASING--LEVERAGED LEASING 24-25 (Bruce E. Fritch & Albert F.
Reisman eds., 1977). Here the moving company-lessee already owns the trucks. The
mover first sells the trucks to a finance lessor, which in turn leases them "back" to the
lessee. See U.G.G. § 2A-103(l)(g) official cmt. (1991). Note that the lessee-mover, in
this transaction, is also the supplier. Thus, both the lease and the supply contract run
between the lessee and the bank; and, because a finance lease is a "lease," rather than a
secured sale, the parties may acquire benefits that would be unavailable in a purchase.
The mover will, of course, want to ensure that it does not lose any warranty benefits
that it presently holds from the manufacturer at the time of sale. To protect these bene-
fits, the mover will usually assign its warranty rights to the finance lessor: Article 2A
provides that the benefit of such warranties, obtained by the lessor as part of the supply
contract (the assignment from the mover-lessee to the finance lessor), will extend to the
finance lessee as a beneficiary of the supply contract. Id § 2A-209(l). See infra notes 57-
67 and accompanying text. For the text of § 2A-209, see infra note 16. The bank's
function in the transactions is strictly economic; the lessee's motivation is likely to be
economic as well, with tax considerations often playing a major role. Finally, other fac-
tors, such as insurance, may bear on the choice of transaction type.
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103(l)(g) 1 2 defines a finance lease and describes the structural rela-
tionships between lessor, lessee, and supplier. Second, section 2A-
40713 details the nature of a lessee's obligation to pay rent. This
section enacts a standard provision in a finance lease known as a
12 Section 2A-103(1)(g) reads:
"Finance lease" means a lease with respect to which:
(i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods;
(ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use of
the goods in connection with the lease; and
(iii) one of the following occurs:
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by whikh the lessor
acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods
before signing the lease contract;
(B) the lessee's approval of the contract by which the lessor acquired
the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods is a condi-
tion to effectiveness of the lease contract;
(C) the lessee, before signing the lease contract, receives an accurate
and complete statement designating the promises and warranties,
and any disclaimers of warranties, limitations or modifications of
remedies, or liquidated damages, including those of a third party,
such as the manufacturer of the goods, provided to the lessor by the
person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the con-
tract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to posses-
sion and use of the goods; or
(D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the lessor, before the lessee
signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in writing (a) of the iden-
tity of the person supplying the goods to the lessor, unless the lessee
has selected that person and directed the lessor to acquire the goods
or the right to possession and use of the goods from that person,
(b) that the lessee is entitled under this Article to the promises and
warranties, including those of any third party, provided to the lessor
by the person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of
the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to
possession and use of the goods, and (c) that the lessee may commu-
nicate with the person supplying the goods to the lessor and receive
an accurate and complete statement of those promises and
warranties, including any disclaimers and limitations of them or of
remedies.
Id § 2A-103(l)(g).
13 Section 2A-407 reads:
Irrevocable Promises: Finance Leases
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease the lessee's
promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent
upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods..
(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent under sub-
section (1):
(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and by or against
third parties including assignees of the parties; and
(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudia-
tion, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the party to whom
the promise runs.
(3) This section does not affect the validity under any other law of a cove-
nant in any lease contract making the lessee's promises irrevocable and
independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.
Id. § 2A-407.
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"hell or high water clause," 1 4 which makes the lessee's obligation to
pay rent "irrevocable and independent."' 5 This assurance of pay-
ment is a major incentive to the lessor to provide the funds neces-
sary for a finance lease transaction.
Finally, section 2A-2091 6 is the source of the most important
warranties extended to the lessee. Article 2A greatly restricts the
scope of potential warranties provided by the lessor to the lessee,
unlike those provided under the typical bilateral lease.' 7 This re-
striction follows from the finance lessor's limited role in the overall
set of transactions-a role inconsistent with the assumption of ex-
tensive warranty obligations. Section 2A-209, however, balances
this restricted scope by providing that a lessee's warranties under a
finance lease stem from the supplier of the goods rather than the
lessor. This is accomplished by making the lessee a beneficiary of any
promises and warranties the supplier has made to the lessor in the
supply contract.' 8 As a result, the lessee assumes a position close to
that of a buyer, looking directly to the supplier in matters of warranty
rather than to the lessor.
14 Id § 2A-407 official cmt.
15 Id.
16 Section 2A-209 reads:
(1) The benefit of a supplier's promises to the lessor under the supply
contract and of all warranties, whether express or implied, including
those of any third party provided in connection with or as part of the
supply contract, extends to the lessee to the extent of the lessee's lease-
hold interest under a finance lease related to the supply contract, but is
subject to the terms of the warranty [sic] and of the supply contract and all
defenses or claims arising therefrom.
(2) The extension of the benefit of a supplier's promises and of warran-
ties to the lessee (Section 2A-209(l)) does not: (i) modify the rights and
obligations of the parties to the supply contract, whether arising there-
from or otherwise, or (ii) impose any duty or liability under the supply
contract on the lessee.
(3) Any modification or rescission of the supply contract by the supplier
and the lessor is effective between the supplier and the lessee unless,
before the modification or rescission, the supplier has received notice
that the lessee has entered into a finance lease related to the supply con-
tract. If the modification or rescission is effective between the supplier
and the lessee, the lessor is deemed to have assumed, in addition to the
obligations of the lessor to the lessee under the lease contract, promises
of the supplier to the lessor and warranties that were so modified -or re-
scinded as they existed and were available to the lessee before modifica-
tion or rescission.
(4) In addition to the extension of the benefit of the supplier's promises
and of warranties to the lessee under subsection (1), the lessee retains all
rights that the lessee may have against the supplier which arise from an
agreement between the lessee and the supplier or under other law.
Id. § 2A-209.
17 In a bilateral lease warranties generally follow the model of Article 2.
18 Id. § 2A-209 official cmt.
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This Note will first set out, in Part I, the attributes of the statu-
tory finance lease of Article 2A, illustrating how they combine in a
unified structure. Part II will consider the relationship of the sup-
plier and lessee in light of the third party beneficiary and contract
assignment theories relied on by the Article. Part III will treat,
through the framing of three hypothetical cases, the interaction of
the hell or high water provision with the third party beneficiary as-
pect of the supply contract. Finally, this Note will propose ways to
avoid and remedy ambiguities and uncertainties in the statutory lan-
guage which could potentially upset the expectations of the parties.
I
THE STATUTORY FINANCE LEASE UNDER ARTICLE 2A
Building on existing leasing practices, 19 the finance lease struc-
ture of Article 2A careftilly balances several complementary rights
and duties among the parties. 20 There are three basic requirements
for the creation of a finance lease: (1) the lessor must not select,
manufacture, or supply the goods;2 1 (2) the lessor must not lease
the goods from inventory;22 and (3) the lessee must have access to
the supply contract, or to information concerning warranties con-
tained in the supply contract. 23 The first two requirements sharply
restrict the lessor's relationship to the leased goods, specifically with
respect to their selection, manufacture, supply, and prior owner-
ship. The third requirement concerns the notice that a finance lease
lessee must receive with respect to the benefit of warranties estab-
lished by Article 2A between the supplier and the lessee. Once the
statutory requirements are met, the finance lease becomes effective,
with Article 2A relieving the lessor of many duties it would other-
wise bear under a "normal" bilateral lease. This section will identify
the three statutory requirements for the establishment of a finance
19 The finance lease provisions in Article 2A start from the presumption of a set of
"arms-length" commercial transactions, involving parties of equal bargaining power, ex-
ceptions are made for settings involving "consumer leases." See, e.g., id. § 2A-407(l)
(rendering ineffective, in a consumer lease, the statutory "hell or high water" clause
otherwise making lessee's obligations "irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's
acceptance of the goods"). Article 2A is intended to govern all leases of personal prop-
erty; thus, the range of transactions-from brief rentals of a chain saw to long-term
leases of truck fleets-will be enormous, as will the variety of parties entering into the
leases. The variety of goods leased and parties involved in finance leases, will also be
large, the only difference being that the lessors will be predominantly financial institu-
tions. On the scope of the leasing business, see generally Reisman, supra note 11, at 1-3.
20 This is notable in the relationship of §§ 2A-209 and 2A-407.
21 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g)(i) (1991).
22 Id. § 2A-103(l)(g)(ii).
23 Id. § 2A-103(l)(g)(iii).
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lease under Article 2A, and discuss their implications on the rights
and duties among the three parties.
A. U.C.C. § 2A-103(g): Requirements of Statutory Finance
Lease
The statutory finance lease of Article 2A is in itself a bilateral
lease-that is, a contract between lessor and lessee-but it stands in
a close and specially defined relationship to a second, related con-
tract-the "supply contract" 24-between the supplier and lessor. In
order for a lease25 to qualify as a "finance lease" under Article 2A,
three requirements must be met, each consistent with the limitation
on the role played by the lessor in financing the lessee's activities.
First, the lessor must "not select, manufacture, or supply the
goods." 26 Selection and specification of goods is normally per-
formed by the lessee, who, as user of the goods, is most familiar with
its own requirements and best positioned to ensure that the goods
selected are suitable for the intended purpose. Prohibiting the les-
sor from "select[ion], manufacture, or supply" 27 is consistent with
relieving it of any statutory obligation to extend implied warranties
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.28 Such war-
ranties are not ordinarily extended by the lessor in a finance lease.
Second, the lessor must not lease the goods out of inventory.
Its ownership of the goods, or, in the alternative, its right to possess
and use the goods,29 only arises "in connection with the [finance]
lease." 30 Again, this is consistent with the limited role of the lessor
in the overall transaction.
Finally, section 2A-103(1)(g)(iii) makes the effectiveness of the
finance lease conditioned upon the lessee's access to the supply con-
tract or to certain related information. Section 2A-103(1) (g)(iii) de-
lineates four conditions, only one of which must be satisfied, in
24 See supra note 9.
25 A finance lease is a species of lease under Article 2A. Section 2A-103(l)(j) treats
"lease" generally, defining it as:
a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return
for consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or
return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease. Un-
less the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease.
Id. § 2A-103(I)(j).
26 Id. § 2A-103(1)(g)(i).
27 Id.
28 Id. §§ 2A-212(l), 2A-213.
29 The lessor may itself obtain the goods by lease, rather than by taking an owner-
ship interest in them. Id. § 2A-103(l)(y).
30 Id. § 2A-103(1)(g)(ii). The meaning of "in connection with the lease" is not fur-
ther defined. The official comment states that "[tihe scope of the phrase 'in connection
with' is to be developed by the courts." Id. § 2A-103 official cmt.
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order to have an effective lease.31 If one of these conditions is met
and the parties satisfy the other two requirements of section 2A-
103(1)(g), 3 2 lessor and lessee have effectively entered into a finance
lease as defined by Article 2A.3 3
The restricted role played by the lessor in a finance lease-
essentially the provision of funds for the purchase or lease of goods
from the supplier-has implications on each of the parties' obliga-
tions under the two contracts. The lessor's obligations differ signifi-
cantly from those found in the "usual" bilateral lease transaction,
and in view of the lessor's role,,Article 2A seeks to ensure that the
lessor receives its payments due from the lessee. *This is accom-
plished by the "hell or high water" clause of section 2A-407, which
makes the lessee's payment obligation "irrevocable and independ-
ent" upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.
Apparently, only three ways exist by which the lessee may avoid
this obligation: (1) if the lessor breaches the general obligation of
good faith; (2) if the lessee justifiably revokes acceptance under sec-
tion 2A-517; and (3) if the lessor breaches either express warranties
made under section 2A-210 or warranties against claims of third
parties under section 2A-21 1(1). While section 2A-407 would ap-
pear to put the lessee in a weak position, Article 2A balances it with
section 2A-209, which makes the lessee the beneficiary of the
promises and warranties made to the lessor in the supply contract.
In so doing, Article 2A erects a unified structure of rights and obli-
gations extending over both contracts.
31 See supra note 12 for the requirements of an Article 2A finance lease.
32 These relate respectively to the "select[ion], manufacture, or supply" of the
goods and to the requirement that the lessor "acquires the goods or the right to posses-
sion and use of the goods in connection with the lease." U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g)(i)-(ii)
(1991).
33 The rationale behind § 2A-103(1)(g)(iii) becomes dear when one understands
the real dimensions of the lessor's role in the transactions. Since the lessor is only a
financing party, has played no part in the selection, manufacture, or supply of the goods,
a § 2A-103(1)(g)(i), and is prohibited from even possessing the goods before negotia-
tion of the finance lease, id § 2A-103(1)(g)(ii), the lessor is relieved of the necessity of
extending any warranties to the lessee. Id § 2A-211 official cmt. (1987). However,
whatever warranties the supplier makes to the lessor in the supply contract also extend
from the supplier to the lessee; this notwithstanding the lack of privity between lessee
and supplier. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text. The drafters of Article 2A
ensured that, before entering into the finance lease, the lessee would be given notice of
all such warranties (or at least the means to obtain notice), id § 2A-103(1)(g)(iii), that
the supplier makes to the lessor. Section 2A-103(l)(g)(iii) serves this purpose. Only if
the finance lease is a consumer lease (as defined in § 2A-103(1)(e)) must there be actual
notice of warranties to the lessee (or the right to condition the finance lease on approval
of, or viewing of, the supply contract). In the typical commercial (nonconsumer) setting,
the lessee must only be given the identity of the supplier, and notification that it is enti-
ded to a statement from the supplier of the "promises and warranties" made to the
lessor. Id § 2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(D).
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These provisions-the hell or high water clause of section 2A-
407 and the beneficiary aspect of section 2A-209, respectively-will
be discussed in the following sections.
B. U.C.C. § 2A-407: Lessee's Obligations Under the Statutory
Hell or High Water Clause
As discussed above, the lessor may not itself select, manufac-
ture or supply the goods. 34 It may, however, negotiate the price to
be paid to the supplier. Indeed, the statute provides a method by
which this information-which could be important should the lessee
later seek damages for breach of either the lease or the supply con-
tract-may be kept out of the hands of the lessee.35
The interaction of supplier and lessee, prior to the actual nego-
tiation of the terms of sale, typically resembles that of a seller and
buyer (or, perhaps, lessor and lessee in a bilateral lease) to a greater
extent than the interaction of the supplier and lessor. The lessee
knows its own requirements and will negotiate directly with the sup-
plier as to the specifications of the goods. 36 The lessor, while for-
mally taking ownership of the goods, will actually only be
transferring the funds necessary to their purchase; delivery will be
directly from supplier to lessee, in a manner similar to that if the
lessee were a buyer.
With the lessor's remote involvement with the leased goods and
close focus on the financing aspects of the transaction, Article 2A
provides the lessor with a high level of assurance that, in a finance
lease, the stream of payments constituting the lessee's consideration
will be uninterrupted. Section 2A-407(1) states that "[i]n the case
of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease the lessee's promises
under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon
34 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
35 The lessee may also negotiate over the price paid to the supplier. For example,
the lessee's negotiations with the supplier may culminate in a purchase order, which the
lessee then assigns to the lessor, or, in a sale-leaseback arrangement, the lessee may
purchase the goods from the supplier, sell them to the lessor, and then lease them back
through the finance lease contract. In both cases, the lessee negotiates the price in the
supply contract. Id. § 2A-103(g) official cmt. (1987). See supra note I 1 and accompany-
ing text. Obtaining warranty information can be achieved at the time of formation of the
finance lease by conforming the transaction to either §§ 2A-103(l)(g)(iii)(C) or (D).
These sections allow the lessee to obtain either a statement of promises and warranties
running from supplier to lessor, or the identity of the supplier, and also grant the lessee
the right to receive from the supplier a statement of the promises and warranties. This
would appear to give the lessor greater freedom to bargain for the best terms obtainable
from the supplier than might be the case were the lessee, when negotiating the lease,
always privy to the price the lessor is paying the supplier.
36 Even if the lessor does know the requirements of the lessee, it cannot participate
at the selection stage. U.C.G. § 2A-f03(l}(g)(i) (1991).
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the lessee's acceptance of the goods."37 In pre-Article 2A finance
leases, a lease provision which created an irrevocable promise to pay
rent was very common,38 and often referred to as a "hell or high
water clause."39 Simply put, the lessee must pay rent "come hell or
high water"; no excuse will be available to relieve the lessee of its
obligation. 40 Once the lessee accepts the goods,4 1 payment may not
be interrupted without the lessor's consent,42 even if the lessor's
performance is deficient.43
The hell or high water clause is a critical part of the finance
lease structure. This is evident from the fact that if a lease qualifies
as a finance lease under section 2A-103(1)(g), then the hell or high
water clause of section 2A-407 becomes a statutory term of the
lease. 44 No separate drafting is required.45
C. Avoidance by Lessee of the Hell or High Water Clause
The hell or high water clause is not, however, watertight. The
official comment to section 2A-407 indicates that there are three
ways in which a lessee might avoid a hell or high water clause after
accepting the goods. First, "[t]he provisions of [section 2A-407] re-
main subject to the obligation of good faith (Sections 2A-103(4) and
1-203)." 4 6 A breach of this obligation, which is applicable to all
conduct governed by the U.C.C.,4 7 would presumably enable the
lessee to avoid its obligation to pay under section 2A-407.48
37 Id § 2A-407(I).
38 WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 24-27.
39 Id
40 The only exceptiofis are lessor's breach of good faith, lessee's revocation of ac-
ceptance under § 2A-517, and lessee's legal action against lessor for breach of warranty.
See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
41 See U.C.C. § 2A-515 (1991) (acceptance of goods); id § 2A-516 (effect of
acceptance).
42 Id. § 2A-407(2)(b).
43 Courts have almost invariably upheld such obligations. See, e.g., In re O.P.M.
Leasing Serv., Inc. v. West Virginia, 21 Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 993 (1982); National Equipment
Rental, Ltd. v.J & I Carting, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Dixie Groceries,
Inc. v. Albany Business Mach., Inc., 274 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Citicorp Indus.
Credit Inc. v. Rountree, 364 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
44 U.C.C. § 2A-407 official cmt. (1991) ("This section is self-executing; no special
provision need be added to the contract."). Note, however, that a consumer lease has
no statutory hell or high water clause. Id. § 2A-407(1). Whether the parties to a finance
lease that is also a consumer lease may agree to an enforceable hell or high water clause
"will continue to be determined by the facts of each case." IME § 2A-407 official cmt.
45 The parties, of course, are free to tailor a more, or less, restrictive clause, or even
dispense with its obligations altogether by separate drafting.
46 U.C.C. § 2A-407 official cmt. (1991).
47 Id § 1-203.
48 Avoidance of hell or high water obligations in commercial settings is virtually
unknown. For a rare (and old) example, see U.S. Leasing Corp v. Franklin Plaza Apart-
ments, Inc., 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (C.C.N.Y. 1971) (summary judgment for plaintiff-lessor
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Second, the official comment explicitly states that the lessee's
obligations under section 2A-407 are also "subject to . . . the
lessee's revocation of acceptance (Section 2A-517)." 49 This possi-
bility requires further discussion. Revocation of acceptance under
section 2A-517 50 occurs after acceptance of the goods-the event
which triggers the effect of section 2A-407's hell or high water pro-
visions. Section 2A-517 is carefully drafted to ensure that the lessee
may revoke acceptance and be released from its obligation in very
few circumstances. A finance lessee may only revoke acceptance
where the nonconformity of the goods "substantially impairs its
value to the lessee if the lessee has accepted [them] ... without
discovery of the nonconformity [and] if the lessee's acceptance was
reasonably induced ... by the lessor's assurances." 5' Thus, only if
the lessor bears some degree of responsibility for the lessee's previ-
ous acceptance of inadequate goods, will the lessee be able to re-
voke acceptance, "turn back the clock," and avoid its obligations
under section 2A-407. 52
Finally, the official comment to section 2A-407 provides the
lessee with a cause of action should the lessor breach warranty obli-
denied, and trial ordered over issue of unconscionability of finance lessor's hell or high
water obligation to pay rent on unusable Pitney-Bowes machine); see also Angelle v.
Energy Builders Co., 496 So.2d 509 (La. App. 1986) (hell or high water clause avoided
because goods not delivered by supplier, on grounds of denial of "peaceable
possession").
49 Id. Section 2A-407 is itself silent about the effect of revocation of acceptance on
the "irrevocable" nature of the lessee's promises. Id. § 2A-407(1). See WHrrE & SUrM-
MERS, supra note 1, at 32-34. Section 2A-517(5) states that "[a] lessee who so revokes
[acceptance] has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if the
lessee had rejected them." Id § 2A-517(5). It is only in the official comment to § 2A-
407 that one learns that this can "undo" the hell or high water obligation. On such use
of the official comments, see generally Donald J. Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in
Lessor's Remedies under Article 2A: Using Official Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute, 39
ALA. L. REV. 875 (1988).
50 The statutory analogue in Article 2 is § 2-608.
51 U.C.C. § 2A-517(l)(b) (1991). See Michael I. Tsai, Comment, A Unified Treatment
of Finance Lessees' Revocation of Acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 967, 983 (1989). Section 2A-517 provides for more liberal rights to revoke accept-
ance in the case of a finance lease that is a consumer lease. U.C.C. § 2A-517(2) (1991).
In addition, the lease parties may independently agree to allow for revocation "because
of other defaults of the lessor." Id. § 2A-517(3).
52 The statute, in contrast, to the official comment, is less than forthcoming on this
point. However, it is arguable that the last part of § 2A-517(5) establishes the ability of
the lessee to avoid the hell or high water clause through revocation. Though § 2A-
517(5)'s citation of "rights ... with regard to the goods involved," id., appears to refer
to the right to dispose of the goods described in § 2A-512(l)(b), one might argue that,
because rightful rejection of goods precludes triggering of the hell or high water obliga-
tion, the lessee gains through an effective revocation the "right" not to pay rent. Section
2A-509 governs rejection, which is allowed "if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in
any respect to conform to the lease contract." Id. § 2A-509(l) (Section 2A-509(l) is
modeled on § 2-601.). Id. § 2A-509 official cmt. Following rejection, the lessee's duties
are spelled out in § 2A-512, which reads:
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gations to the lessee established under sections 2A-210 and 2A-
211(1).5 s Though section 2A-210 concerns express warranties of
the lessor to the lessee, in the finance lease setting, because of the
lessor's limited role in choosing the goods, such warranties are
rarely made.5 4 Similarly, though section 2A-2 11(1) requires the les-
sor to warrant against claims of third parties to the goods caused by
"an act or omission of the lessor," 55 the lessor's limited involvement
with the goods themselves suggests that such situations seldom will
arise. 56
D. U.C.C. § 2A-209: Lessee as Beneficiary of Supply Contract
In building a unified structure, Article 2A balances the lessee's
weak position under the hell or high water clause with section 2A-
209's provision that the lessee shall be the beneficiary of the
promises and warranties made to the lessor. in the supply contract.
Before Article 2A, courts frequently inferred the relationship be-
Lessee's Duties as to Rightfully Rejected Goods.
(1) Except as otherwise provided with respect to goods that threaten to
decline in value speedily (Section 2A-51 1) and subject to any security in-
terest of a lessee (Section 2A-508(5)):
(a) the lessee, after rejection of goods in the lessee's possession, shall
hold them with reasonable care at the lessor's or the supplier's dispo-
sition for a reasonable time after the lessee's seasonable notification
of rejection;
(b) if the lessor or the supplier gives no instructions within a reason-
able time after notification of rejection, the lessee may store the re-
jected goods for the lessor's or the supplier's account or ship them to
the lessor or the supplier or dispose of them for the lessor's or the
supplier's account with reimbursement in the manner provided in
Section 2A-51 1; but
(c) the lessee has no further obligations with regard to goods right-
fully rejected.
(2) Action by the lessee pursuant to subsection (1) is not acceptance or
conversion.
Id § 2A-512.
Section 2A-512 charges the lessee who has rejected goods with the duty to hold
them with reasonable care; § 2A-517(3) charges a lessee who revokes acceptance with
the same duty.
53 U.C.C. § 2A-407 official cmt. (1991). These warranties are (1) express warran-
ties created by the lessor (§ 2A-210), and (2):
a warranty that for the lease term no person holds a claim to or interest in
the goods that arose from an act or omission of the lessor, other than a
claim by way of infringement or the like, which will interfere with the
lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold interest.
Id. § 2A-21 1(1). Section 2A-21 1(1) thus "reinstates the warranty of quiet possession
with respect to leases." Id § 2A-211 official cmt. This was abandoned in Article 2.
54 But see infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
55 U.C.C. § 2A-211(1) (1991).
56 Still, such situations can be imagined. For example, the lessor might want to sell
or lease the goods to a party other than the lessee, or might fail to pay the supplier for
the goods.
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tween supplier and lessee from the overall pattern of activities and
obligations established in the two contracts. Courts found it neces-
sary to engage in such an inquiry because they faced a situation in
which there was no privity of contract between the supplier and the
lessee.57 Given that the lessor's role is basically restricted to financ-
ing the purchase or lease of the goods from the supplier, the rela-
tionship between the lessee and supplier closely resembles that of
buyer and seller in a sales contract. Article 2A puts this relationship
between supplier and lessee on a statutory footing.
E. Analogy of Supplier-Lessee Relationship to Sales Law
In recognizing this similarity,58 the statute provides that, de-
spite the absence of contractual privity between the supplier and the
lessee, the lessee gains the "benefit" of whatever promises and war-
ranties the supplier, in the supply contract, has made to the lessor.59
The effect of this provision is very broad; section 2A-209 seeks to
put the lessee, insofar as the promises and warranties of the supply
contract are concerned, in the same position as the lessor (i.e., the
57 Prior to Article 2A, courts sometimes analogized leases to sales, and brought
certain aspects of lease transactions under the control of principles drawn from Article
2. At least one commentator has considered the utility of characterizing a finance lease
as essentially a sale between supplier and lessee, with the lessee and lessor entering into
a separate contract to finance the purchase. See Amelia H. Boss, Panacea or Nightmare?
Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U. L. REv. 39, 57-78 (1984).
Frequently, however, courts have granted the lessee buyer-like rights against the
supplier through employment of third party beneficiary doctrine. Following the doc-
trine of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the lessee would be an "intended" beneficiary of
the supplier-lessor relationship (as opposed to being an "incidental" beneficiary). As
such, the lessee would gain the right to bring an independent action against the supplier
for enforcement of the promises and warranties under the supply contract. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 302 (1981). Several pre-Article 2A cases have viewed
the lessee in this way. See, e.g., Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs, 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.
1980); Abco Metals Corp. v.J.W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. I11. 1982); In re
O.P.M. Leasing Serv., Inc. v. West Virginia, 21 Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 993 (1982); Bay General
Indus., Inc. v.Johnson, 418 A.2d 1050 (D.C. 1980). But see Professional Lens Plan, Inc.
v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887 (Kan. 1984) (lack of privity between remote seller
of component part and lessee precludes award of purely economic consequential dam-
ages).
One case recognizing third party beneficiary rights in the lessee distinguished the
nature of the underlying transactions from the single bilateral contract model of the
Restatement. See Freeman v. Hubco Leasing, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 462, 467 (Ga. 1985):
[lI]essee Freeman under automobile lease is "not the typical third party
beneficiary; ... [lessee] is not a stranger to the transaction at hand[; he] is
a lessee-purchaser of ... a manufacturer's warranty transmitted by Hub
Motor [lessor], a DeLorean [supplier] dealer, which provides that
DeLorean dealers will repair manufacturer's defects without charge.
Freeman paid a consideration for this warranty and hence . . .is more
than merely a third party beneficiary of the DeLorean-Hub Motor dealer-
ship contract.
58 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-209 official cmt. (1991).
59 Id. § 2A-209. For the text of section 2A-209, see supra note 16.
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lessee gains the benefit of any warranties the supply contract gives
the finance lessor as a buyer or lessee itself, "to the extent of the
lessee's leasehold interest"). 60 Though the lessee's obligation to
pay rent continues, 61 the lessee gains a right of action in return, in-
dependent of any claims the lessor might assert against the supplier,
should the supplier breach any promises extended to the finance
lessor. Section 2A-209 works in concert with the definition of a fi-
nance lease in section 2A-103(1)(g), which guarantees the finance
lessee the knowledge, or the ability to obtain knowledge,62 of those
promises and warranties.
In addition, section 2A-209 ensures that, should the supplier
and lessor modify or rescind the supply contract, the lessee's posi-
tion as beneficiary of the supply contract will not be eroded.63 Sec-
tion 2A-209(3) allows "modification or rescission" of the supply
contract, made before the supplier has notice that the lessee is part of
a finance lease, to be "effective against the lessee." 64 In such cases,
however, section 2A-209(3) requires that the lessor step in and ex-
tend to the lessee the promises and warranties "as they existed and
were available to the lessee before modification or rescission." 65
This is potentially strong medicine for a lessor. By discouraging
modification of the supply contract, it provides an incentive for the
lessor to ensure that the supplier is locked into its obligations to the
lessee-beneficiary. 66 Note that a lessor who presumptively assumes
such a promise or warranty would still have a right to payment
60 U.C.C. § 2A-209(1) (1991).
61 Except in limited circumstances, i.e., where there is a rightful revocation of ac-
ceptance under § 2A-517, and if the lessor breaches, as prescribed by §§ 2A-210 or 2A-
211(1). See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
62 U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(D) (1991). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
63 IME § 2A-209(3). For the text of § 2A-209(3) see supra note 16.
64 Id. § 2A-209(3).
65 d Section 2A-209(3) literally requires that the lessor in such a situation assume
the entire extent of the promise or warranty that was modified-that is, the promise or
warranty as it existed prior to the modification--and not just the extent of the modifica-
tion. For example, assume that a supply contract originally specified that the supplier
was to provide repairs for five years, and that the supplier and lessor subsequently
agreed to change this to four years. If this modification was made prior to the supplier
receiving notice of the lessee entering into a related finance lease, the language of § 2A-
209(3) would have the lessor take on responsibility for allfive years of repairs. Arguably,
this is the plain meaning of the phrase:
the lessor is deemed to have assumed, in addition to the obligations of
the lessor to the lessee under the lease contract, promises of the supplier
to the lessor and warranties that were so modified or rescinded as they
existed and were available to the lessee before modification or rescission.
Id. (emphasis added). This interpretation seems to go too far, in that after the modifica-
tion the supplier still agrees to four years of repairs. The statute should be interpreted
to require the lessor to guarantee only the year of repairs that the modification of the
supply contract has eliminated, not to apply a penalty against the lessor.
66 But see infra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
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under the hell or high water provision of section 2A-407. However,
though the lessee's cause of action against the supplier regarding
the modification or rescission would be lost, the lessee could still
proceed directly against the lessor for any breach of the promises
and warranties as they were originally extended to the lessee.67
II
THEORIES OF THE SUPPLIER AND LESSEE RELATIONSHIP
Section 2A-209 makes the lessee the beneficiary of the promises
and warranties made by the supplier to the lessor in the lease con-
tract, despite the absence of privity of contract between supplier and
lessee. The official comment to section 2A-209 explicitly addresses
the means by which the absence of privity between supplier and
lessee is overcome. One can infer from the comment that there are
two competing theories for overcoming the lack of privity: one
grounded in the rights of a third party beneficiary and the other in
the rights of an assignee of a contract.
As with the operation of the hell or high water provision of sec-
tion 2A-407, Article 2A makes this "beneficiary" aspect of the sup-
plier's promises and warranties mandatory: the official comment to
section 2A-209 states that "[a]s a matter of policy, this provision
may not be excluded, modified, or limited."68 However, section 2A-
209 does not adopt the assignment or third party beneficiary theory
completely, perhaps because neither theory conforms exactly to the
supplier-lessee relationship established by Article 2A. Comparison
of each theory with the provisions of section 2A-209 illustrates the
effect each has on finance lease transactions.
Section 2A-209 focuses on two distinct topics, each concerned
with the relationship of supplier to lessee. Sections 2A-209(1)-(2)
address the status of the lessee with respect to the supply contract,
along with the defenses available to the supplier against the lessee.
Section 2A-209(3) concerns the effect, as against the lessee, of mod-
ification and rescission of the supply contract by the supplier and
lessor. According to the official comment, section 2A-209 is
"modeled on Section 9-318, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§§ 302-315 (1981), and leasing practices." 69 Section 9-318 of the
67 U.C.C. § 2A-209 official cmt. (1991) ("Enforcement of this benefit is by action.").
68 Id. Section 2A-209 thus codifies the practice, common in the leasing business, of
putting the lessee in the shoes of the lessor with respect to the supplier's promises and
warranties. Note that in addition to the supplier's promises and warranties, § 2A-209
also makes the lessee the beneficiary of any express or implied warranties "including
those of any third party provided in connection with or as part of the supply contract."
Id. § 2A-209(l).
69 Id. § 2A-209 official cmt- (emphasis added). In citing U.CC. § 9-318 and
§§ 302-315 of the Restatement (Second), the official comment explicitly recognizes the
[Vol. 77:318
NOTE-FINANCE LEASES
U.C.C. points to the contract assignment theory as a means of over-
coming the lack of privity; sections 302-315 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts point to third party beneficiary theory. Each of this
section's two main topics-(1) the lessee's status under the supply
contract and the supplier's defenses against the lessee, and (2) the
effectiveness of modifications of the supply contract-will be consid-
ered in light of these two theories. Through this examination, the
primary reliance of section 2A-209 on third party beneficiary theory
will be demonstrated.
A. Lessee's Status Under the Supply Contract and Supplier's
Defenses Against the Lessee
1. Assignment Theory
Section 9-318 of the U.C.G. concerns the respective rights of
account debtors and assignees, before and after assignment of a
contract between an account debtor and an assignor. The section
establishes rules governing the rights of an assignee under an as-
signed contract. 70 Section 9-318(2) deals with the effectiveness of
modifications of the assigned contract after notification of assign-
ment to the account debtor.71
A comparison of sections 9-318 and 2A-209 indicates the extent
to which the lessee has been given "assignee-like" rights against the
supplier. Such rights are subject, according to section 9-318(1)(a),
to "all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom. '7 2 Section 2A-
sources of Article 2A's lessee beneficiary status in assignment and third party beneficiary
theories.
70 Section 9-318(1) reads:
(1) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to
assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-
206 the rights of an assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and as-
signor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the as-
signor which accrues before the account debtor receives notification
of the assignment.
Id. § 9-318(1).
71 Section 9-318(2) reads:
(2) So far as the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned
contract has not been fully earned by performance, and notwithstanding
notification of the assignment, any modification of or substitution for the
contract made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commer-
cial standards is effective against an assignee unless the account debtor
has otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corresponding rights
under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide
that such modification or substitution is a breach by the assignor.
Id. § 9-318(2).
72 Id. § 9-318(1)(a).
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209(1) closely tracks this language and states that the rights of the
lessee are "subject to the terms of the warranty [sic] and of the sup-
ply contract and all defenses or claims arising therefrom. '73 Both
sections 9-318(1) and 2A-209(1), therefore, would permit the obli-
gor (account debtor or supplier) to recoup losses suffered in con-
nection with the obligee (assignor or lessor), by a claim or defense
against the assignee or lessee. For example, suppose that a finance
lessee, as beneficiary of a supply contract, was entitled to repairs on
equipment leased under a related lease contract, but that the lessor
had fallen behind in payments to the supplier. The supplier, assert-
ing against the lessee its losses arising from the lessor's conduct
under the supply contract, could recoup those losses through the
denial of repairs (or a reduction in their extent) to the lessee.
Sections 9-318(1) and 2A-209(1) differ, however, over claims
and defenses arising outside of the transaction. For example, in a
finance lease setting, the above claim could arise if the supplier and
lessor had engaged in prior dealings and the lessor failed to per-
form fully. The supplier might seek to avoid some warranty obliga-
tions to the lessee as a means of satisfying its claim against the
lessor.
Here section 2A-209 gives the lessee greater protection than an
assignee receives under Article 9. Section 9-318(1)(b) only allows
claims and defenses of the account debtor against the assignor, in-
dependent of the contract, to be asserted against the lessee in some
circumstances.74 In contrast, a finance lessee is protected against
such claims. If the supplier were able to assert a set-off (arising out
of an independent transaction between supplier and lessor) against
the lessee, the supplier would, in effect, be able to modify the
lessee's rights under the supply contract. This would clearly violate
section 2A-209(2), which provides that "[t]he extension of the bene-
fit of a supplier's promises and of warranties to the lessee (Section
2A-209(1)) does not . .. modify the rights and obligations of the
parties to the supply contract, whether arising therefrom or other-
wise." 75 By protecting the lessee against a modification of its rights
under the supply contract, section 2A-209 indirectly prevents the
supplier from holding the lessee responsible for the lessor's in-
dependent obligations to the supplier.
73 Id. § 2A-209(1).
74 The account debtor can assert claims that are independent of the contract only
where the claims arise before the account creditor receives notice of the assignment. Id.
§ 9-318(1)(b).
75 U.C.C. § 2A-209(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
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2. Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
Sections 302 to 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts pro-
vide a different model for overcoming the absence of privity be-
tween supplier and lessee-that of the third party beneficiary
theory. Section 309 addresses the defenses that are available
against the beneficiary. Though the "fit" of this section of the Re-
statement76 to section 2A-209(l) is not exact, it is much closer than
that of section 9-318.
Section 309(2) of the Restatement lists four defenses available to
an obligor to avoid an obligation to a beneficiary: impracticability,
public policy, nonoccurrence of a condition, or present or prospec-
tive failure of performance. 77 Though section 2A-209(1) does not
employ identical language, it is difficult to imagine that such de-
fenses could not be asserted against the beneficiary in a finance
lease setting. Both impracticability and public policy presumably
are available as defenses, under general principles of contract law,
arising from the supply contract. Also, the defenses of nonoccur-
rence of a condition and present or prospective failure of perform-
ance would arise directly from the lessor's conduct under the supply
contract. Hence, as discussed in the previous section, the supplier
would be able to recoup losses caused by the lessor's conduct,
through a reduction in what was due the lessee as beneficiary of the
supply contract.
In contrast to U.C.C. § 9-318, section 309(3) of the Restatement
denies the promisor (supplier) a set-off against the beneficiary
(lessee) arising from an agreement separate from that under which
the beneficiary gains his rights. Thus section 2A-209 conforms
quite closely to the Restatement's rules concerning defenses against a
beneficiary. Especially regarding the matter of set-offs asserted
76 Section 309 of the Restatement reads in full:
Defenses Against the Beneficiary
(1) A promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless a contract is formed
between the promisor and the promisee; and if a contract is voidable or
unenforceable at the time of its formation the right of any beneficiary is
subject to the infirmity.
(2) If a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of im-
practicability, public policy, non-occurrence of a condition, or present or
prospective failure of performance, the right of any beneficiary is to that
extent discharged or modified.
(3) Except as stated in Subsections (1) and (2) and in § 311 or as pro-
vided by the contract, the right of any beneficiary against the promisor is
not subject to the promisor's claims or defenses against the promisee or
to the promisee's claims or defenses against the beneficiary.
(4) A beneficiary's right against the promisor is subject to any claim or
defense arising from his own conduct or agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 (1981).
77 Id
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against the lessee by the supplier, the drafters appear to have
adopted the position that a lessee, with no knowledge of the details
of the lessor's performance of independent obligations to the sup-
plier, should not be subject to claims of the supplier arising out of
such conduct.
B. Effectiveness of Modifications of the Supply Contract
1. Assignment Theory
Section 2A-209(1) concerns the lessee's rights as beneficiary of
the supply contract and the supplier's defenses against the lessee.
In contrast, section 2A-209(3) addresses the effectiveness of modifi-
cations of the supply contract by the supplier and lessor. Again, Ar-
ticle 2A provides greater protection to a lessee than an assignee
receives under section 9-318. Specifically, section 9-318(2) allows
good faith contract modifications or substitutions to be effective
against the assignee even after an account debtor has notice of an
assignment.78 The official comment to section 9-318 points to the
commercial necessity for allowing this, but acknowledges that this
"may do some violence to accepted doctrines of contract law." 79
Section 2A-209(3), in contrast, "locks in" the lessee's benefits under
the supply contract before the supplier has notice of the lessee's entry
into a related finance lease.80 The supplier's obligations to the
lessee remain unaffected by modification or rescission of the supply
contract, regardless of when the supplier receives notice. Thus, sec-
tion 2A-209(3), considered with the analysis of defenses against the
lessee-assignee, gives clear evidence that the drafters only partially
drew analogies from the assignment provisions of Article 9 when
designating the lessee's rights in Article 2A. The lessee, after all, is
not an assignee of the lessor's rights; specifically, the lessor's rights
against the supplier are not modified by the operation of section 2A-
209(l).81
2. Third Party Beneficiary Theory
In general, section 311 of the Restatement 82 conforms closely
with section 2A-209(3)'s provisions concerning the effect of contract
78 See supra note 71.
79 U.C.C. § 9-318 official cmt. (1991).
80 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
81 For the text of § 2A-209(2), see supra note 16.
82 Section 311 of the Restatement reads:
Variation of a Duty to a Beneficiary
(1) Discharge or modification of a duty to an intended beneficiary by
conduct of the promisee or by a subsequent agreement between prom-
isor and promisee is ineffective if a term of the promise creating the duty
so provides.
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modifications on the beneficiary; however, there are some signifi-
cant differences.
The Restatement differs from Article 2A primarily in sections
311(3) and (4). The Restatement would terminate the power to dis-
charge or modify the duty to the beneficiary upon any of three
events: the beneficiary's material reliance, its bringing of suit on the
promise, or its requested assent to the promise. 83 This differs sig-
nificantly from the termination event in section 2A-209(3), which is
receipt of notice of the finance lease by the supplier. Under the Re-
statement, entry into the finance lease-a material change in position
by the lessee, in reliance on the extension to the lessee of the supply
contract's promises and warranties-is itself sufficient to trigger ter-
mination of the power to discharge or rescind the beneficiary's
rights.
Section 311(4) of the Restatement also allows a beneficiary to
claim any consideration received by the promisee, after the prom-
isor attempts to discharge or modify the promisor's duty to the ben-
eficiary. As a result, the promisor's duty would be discharged in the
amount received by the beneficiary.
Section 2A-209(3), however, strikes a different balance between
the parties. In the case of an effective modification or rescission of
the supply contract,84 the lessor assumes the original warranties ex-
tended to lessee. Conversely, in the case of an ineffective (i.e., at-
tempted) modification or rescission, the beneficiary's right to the
consideration received by the promisee, recognized by section
311(4) of the Restatement, is absent.
In sum, with respect to the lessee's rights under the supply con-
tract, section 2A-209 relies to a greater extent on third party benefi-
ciary theory than on assignment theory. Article 2A gives the lessee
greater protection than an assignee receives under section 9-318,
especially in vulnerable areas such as set-off and contract modifica-
tion. The only differences between section 2A-209 and the Restate-
(2) In the absence of such a term, the promisor and promisee retain
power to discharge or modify the duty by subsequent agreement.
(3) Such a power terminates when the beneficiary, before he receives no-
tification of the discharge or modification, materially changes his position
in justifiable reliance on the promise or brings suit on it or manifests as-
sent to it at the request of the promisor or promisee.
(4) If the promisee receives consideration for an attempted discharge or
modification of the promisor's duty which is ineffective against the benefi-
ciary, the beneficiary can assert a right to the consideration so received.
The promisor's duty is discharged to the extent of the amount received
by the beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981).
83 Id. § 311(3).
84 That is, one before the supplier receives notice that the lessee has entered into a
finance lease. Id. § 2A-209(3).
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ment appear primarily in the area of contract modification, and here
there is no clearly "higher" level of protection. The Restatement
would insulate a beneficiary against modifications, establishing its
position as a beneficiary earlier than under Article 2A. However,
this is balanced by the provision that, under section 2A-209(3), an
effective modification or rescission triggers the lessor's assumption
of the promises and warranties as they previously existed. Thus, in
the window between the time of material reliance (which, for pur-
poses of argument, may be viewed as the time when the lessee en-
ters the finance lease) and the time of the promisor's (supplier's)
receipt of notice that the lessee entered into the lease, the lessee's
rights may not be modified by the supplier and the lessor: even
before this time, section 2A-209(3) shifted to the lessor any obliga-
tions to the lessee which the supplier could succeed in shaking off.
However, as I will argue below, the lessee might not be indifferent
to the identity of the party charged with the promises and warran-
ties; interchangeability of the supplier and lessor for these purposes
might be at odds with both the lessee's expectations and the realities
of the commercial environment surrounding the lease.
C. Conformity of Third Party Beneficiary Theory to the
Finance Lease
The preceding discussion demonstrates that section 2A-209
closely implements traditional third party beneficiary theory as set
out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Clearly, this theory, as
opposed to the assignment principles of section 9-318, was used as a
model. Indeed, the position of the lessee as a beneficiary initially
appears strong: the benefit of all of the supplier's promises and
warranties to the lessor under the supply contract extends to the
lessee by operation of law-that is, the parties to the supply contract
cannot choose which of the supplier's obligations to the lessor will
extend to the lessee-all of them must.85
However, in specifying that the "benefit" of the supplier's
promises to the lessor extends to the lessee, section 2A-209(l) fails
to give the lessee rights, with respect to the supplier, that are identi-
cal with those held by the lessor. The official comment to section
2A-209(1) points out that "[e]nforcement of this benefit is by ac-
tion"; 86 thus, a lessee is restricted to suits on the terms of the supply
contract. A lessee, as a result, will have fewer alternative methods to
85 Thus, the official comment to § 2A-209 makes clear that "selective discrimina-
tion against the beneficiaries [lessees] designated under this section is precluded, i.e.,
exclusion of the supplier's liability to the lessee with respect to warranties made to the
lessor." U.C.C. § 2A-209 official cmt. (1991).
86 Id.
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obtain the "benefit" of the supply contract than the lessor. This can
have important ramifications in at least three areas. First, the re-
striction to enforcement "by action" bears closely on the scope of
the lessee's right to reject, or to revoke acceptance of the leased
goods. 87 Second, the preclusion of "selective discrimination against
the lessee, ' 88 intended to safeguard the lessee's benefit under the
supply contract, may lead to unfortunate limitations on the lessee's
right to damages after a breach by the supplier. This could occur
when a lessee, failing to recognize the statutory equivalence of ben-
efit to lessor and lessee, fails to ensure that the benefits given the
lessor under the supply contract include those that the lessee, as ben-
eficiary, wants for itself.8 9 Finally, difficulties remain in section 2A-
209(3) whereby the lessor is required, after modification of the sup-
ply contract, to assume the promises and warranties to the lessee as
they stood before modification. Because the lessor might be reluc-
tant, or even unable, to duplicate the supplier's level of expertise or
service, the lessee may be denied the benefit of its bargain. How-
ever, the lessee might have a remedy in such a situation, through a
suit against the lessor for breach of an express warranty under section
2A-210(1)(a). As will be discussed in Part III, the promises or war-
ranties assumed by' the lessor after modification become express
warranties through operation of law. In each of these problematic
areas, the parties would be well-advised to contract around the de-
fault provisions of Article 2A, in order to ensure that their expecta-
tions are not later defeated.
III
THREE HYPOTHETICAL CASES
A. Scope of Lessee's Rights: Rejection
The interaction of section 2A-209 with the lessor's rights under
the hell or high water clause is an area of considerable uncertainty in
Article 2A. The statutory hell or high water clause of section 2A-
407 makes the lessee's promises under the lease "irrevocable and
independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods." The hell
87 See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
88 See supra note 85.
89 See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. The lessee's and lessor's interests,
as opposed to their "benefit" under the supply contract, will usually be very different.
Consider, for example, the limited role played by the lessor in a finance lease. Serving
primarily as a source of funds, the lessor has little interest in what the lessee does with
the goods, as long as it (the lessor) gets paid, and the lessee preserves the value of the
lessor's residual interest. The lessee, on the other hand, has a strong interest in know-
ing that the "promises and warranties" of the supplier in the supply contract extend to
it. This aspect of the supply contract may have been negotiated by the lessee, and § 2A-
209(3) takes steps to prevent the lessee's expectations from being upset.
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or high water clause creates a strong obligation for the lessee, be-
cause limited circumstances exist under which this obligation can be
avoided. 90 Aside from breaches of the general obligation of good
faith,91 the warranties against infringement of quiet enjoyment, or
an express provision of the lease agreement,92 revocation of accept-
ance93 appears to be the only means by which the hell of high water
clause can be "undone." Revocation, however, is only available
under the most limited circumstances. This follows from the re-
stricted scope of the warranties made by the lessor under the finance
lease: since the lessor has few warranty obligations, the lessee prop-
erly has only limited defenses against the obligation to pay rent.
Alternatively, section 2A-407 only comes into play upon the
lessee's acceptance of the goods. The lessee may only rightfully re-
ject if the "goods or the tender or the delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the lease contract.' 94 The lessor, therefore, has no incen-
tive to incorporate into the lease contract all of the detailed specifi-
cations commonly found in a supply contract, because negotiation
over such matters relating to selection of the leased goods is outside
the scope of a finance lessor's permissible conduct.95 In addition,
the lessor is unlikely to risk allowing such specifications, because if
they are incorporated into the lease, they could be interpreted as
express warranties 96 to the lessee. As a result, though the goods
might not conform to the supply contract, they may conform with
the general language of the lease contract, and the lessee may not
be able to revoke effectively.
Consider, for example, a finance lease of equipment in which
the equipment specifications are the subject of detailed negotiations
between the lessee and the supplier. The specifications, however,
are incorporated into the supply contract, not into the lessor's fi-
nance lease form. Suppose further that the equipment fails in some
important respect to conform to the supply contract, but conforms
to the limited description in the lease, and that the lessee informs
the lessor of the nonconformity. A reading of section 2A-509 indi-
cates that under Article 2A, the lessee cannot reject on the basis of
such nonconformity-it runs to the supply contract, not the lease. 97
90 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
91 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1991) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obli-
gation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
92 Id. § 2A-407 official cmt.
93 See id. § 2A-407 official cmt. See also id. § 2A-517 and official cmt.
94 Id § 2A-509 (emphasis added).
95 Id. § 2A-103(1)(g)(i).
96 See, e.g., Boss, supra note 57, at 68-70.
97 Section 2A-509(1) reads:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 2A-510 on default in installment
lease contracts, if the goods or the tender or-delivery fail in any respect to
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As a result, under Article 2A's acceptance provisions, the lessee must
accept the goods, the statutory hell or high water clause becomes
effective, and the lessee must pay all the rentals.
The lessor, however, could reject the goods for the noncon-
formity with the supply contract. Such rejection by the lessor, if it
were a purchaser, would be effected via section 2-601. However, if
the lessor were a lessee with respect to the supplier, it would have a
right of rejection through section 2A-509. In addition, the lessee
can bring an action against the supplier under section 2A-209(1) for
the "benefit" due as a beneficiary of the supply contract. Does the
lessee's "benefit" include a right to reject similar- to the buyer's
under section 2-601, in cases where the essor is a buyer under the
supply contract? (Or, in the alternative case under section 2A-509,
where the lessor itself is a lessee under the supply contract?)
The text of section 2A-209 leaves the precise contours of the
term "benefit" undefined. However, the official comment to section
2A-209 appears to suggest that the lessee has such a right; it states
that "an exclusion... or limitation of any term of the supply con-
tract .... including any with respect to rights and remedies, .... effective
against the lessor as buyer under the supply contract, is also effective against
the lessee as the beneficiary designated under this provision."98
Provided that the contract does not expressly deny the lessor the
right to reject, the implication of the comment is that the lessee, as
beneficiary, would have the same right to reject as would the lessor.
(Of course, the lessee's right to reject only arises because of the les-
conform to the lease contract, the lessee may reject or accept the goods or
accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest of the goods.
IM. § 2A-509(I) (emphasis added).
This is reinforced by section 2A-515, which reads:
Acceptance of Goods.
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs after the lessee has had a reasonable op-
portunity to inspect the goods and
(a) the lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner
that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the goods are con-
forming or that the lessee well take or retain them in spite of their
nonconformity; or
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods (Sec-
tion 2A-509(2)).
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that en-
tire unit.
Id. § 2A-515.
The critical term in § 2A-515 is "conforming." This is defined in § 2A-103(d):
"'Conforming' goods or performance under a lease contract means goods or perform-
ance that are in accordance with the obligations under the lease contract." Id. There-
fore, the standard for a finance lessee upon rejection, is whether the goods conform to
the terms of the lease contract, not the supply contract.
98 I § 2A-209 official cmt. (emphasis added).
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sor's right to reject, and the lessee cannot use section 2A-509 to
reject the lease contract itself.)
This conclusion, however, is by no means certain. The lessee
who desires a right to reject for nonconformity with the supply con-
tract, in addition to the right of action against the supplier provided
by operation of section 2A-209(1), would be well-advised to con-
tract around the ambiguity in section 2A-209(1), and negotiate for
rejection rights in the lease contract itself. The lessee should re-
member, however, that rejection precludes operation of the hell or
high water clause of section 2A-407, and the price of obtaining such
a right will reflect the lessor's assessment of the risk that the profit
anticipated from an uninterrupted stream of rent payments may not
be realized.
B. Scope of Remedies: Consequential Damages
The ambiguity relating to the right of a lessee to reject against
the supplier concerns the extent to which rights, accrued to the les-
sor through operation of Article 2 or 2A, also accrued to the lessee
under the "benefit" language of section 2A-209(1). Because Article
2A does not clarify whether the "benefit" under section 2A-209(l)
implies the right of a lessee to invoke the lessor's right of rejection,
it was suggested that a lessee, in order to ensure this right, should
bargain for it as part of the lease contract.
The lessee should be aware of a similar potential problem with
respect to damages for breaches of the supply contract. Consider,
for example, a situation in which the lessor and lessee have entered
into a valid finance lease for a large piece of equipment critical to
the lessee's manufacturing operations. The lessee has an ongoing
production schedule, and needs to put the leased equipment into
operation immediately to ensure its ability to continue to fill orders.
The lessor contracts with the supplier for the equipment; the lessee
is to take delivery at its factory on a date specified in the supply
contract, with payment by the lessor to the supplier upon the
lessee's acceptance of the equipment. The equipment, whose speci-
fications were the subject of detailed negotiation between the lessee
and the supplier, is delivered late by the supplier. The lessee, ur-
gently needing the equipment for his manufacturing operations, ac-
cepts the equipment, which otherwise is as ordered and conforms to
the lease. The late delivery causes the lessee to incur large lost
profits.
Note that, in contrast to the lessee, the lessor has little loss due
to the late delivery. The terms of the supply contract obligate the
lessor to pay only when the equipment is accepted. Since the lessor
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has not yet paid the supplier, the lessor is basically unharmed by the
late delivery.
Now suppose that the supply contract between the supplier and
the lessor contains a term excluding the payment of any conse-
quential damages, including economic losses; incurred by virtue of
the supplier's breach. The lessor, whose interest in the overall fi-
nance lease arrangement is primarily concerned with the profits
gained from rental payments, and who will part with funds only after
the hell or high water clause of section 2A-407 is triggered by the
lessee's acceptance, has little incentive to object to the supply con-
tract's clause excluding consequential damages. (Absence of such a
clause would raise the price of the supply contract without corre-
sponding benefit to the lessor.)
In contrast, a lessee who through the operation of section 2A-
209(1) becomes a beneficiary of such a supply contract would be
unable to assert a claim for consequential damages. Because of the
clause excluding consequential damages, it is unnecessary to inquire
whether the scope of "[t]he benefit of a supplier's promises to the
lessor under the supply contract" 99 includes consequential dam-
ages. With consequential damages unavailable to the lessor, it fol-
lows that they are also unavailable to the lessee. This result flows
directly from the official comment, which makes clear that "[i]f the
supply contract excludes or modifies warranties, limits remedies or
liquidates damages with respect to the lessor, such provisions are
enforceable against the lessee as beneficiary."'100
Suppose that no clause existed in the supply contract excluding
consequential damages. Thus, rather than being a question of
whether the supply contract "excludes or modifies warranties, limits
remedies, or liquidates damages with respect to the lessor,"'1 1 the
focus would return to "[tihe benefit of a supplier's promises to the
lessor under the supply contract."' 102 The lessee could argue that
the supplier failed to deliver the equipment by a certain date as
promised in the supply contract, and is liable to the lessee for any
benefit that the lessee would have gained by timely delivery. Pre-
sumably, the supplier should have known of the lessee's needs be-
cause of the negotiated specifications on the equipment. Thus,
given that the economic damages were foreseeable to the supplier,
99 Id § 2A-209(l).
100 Id. § 2A-209 official cmt. In an ordinary bilateral lease, disclaimers of conse-
quential damages are routinely upheld. See, e.g., Cargile v. Della Coal Serv., 786 F.2d
1163 (6th Cir. 1986) (under Tennessee law U.C.C. not applicable to leases; consequen-
tial damages disclaimer effective against lessee).
101 Id.
102 Id § 2A-209(l).
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the lessee should not be barred from claiming consequential
damages.
The result is that the supplier does not have much of a basis
under section 2A-209 to bolster the argument against consequential
damages. Perhaps the supplier's best argument would be that, be-
cause the supply contract runs between supplier and lessor, the sup-
plier intended its liability for breach to be limited to the amount that
the breach harmed lessor, and not to the amount the breach harmed
lessee. Arguably, the language of the official comment, precluding
selective discrimination against the lessee,10 3 supports a policy that
the damages due a lessee would be of the same magnitude as those
due a lessor. If, for example, the supply contract liquidated dam-
ages, the amount recoverable by either the lessor as a party to the
supply contract, or by the lessee as a beneficiary through section 2A-
209(1), would presumably be the same.10 4 The supplier might then
contend that such parity should exist, whether or not explicit limita-
tions were present: arguably it makes no more sense to adopt a po-
sition of parity between lessor and lessee when explicit limitations
or stipulations of damages exist than when they do not.
On the other side, however, the lessee could point to its
"buyer-like" position in the set of transactions: the detailed negoti-
ations entered into between lessee and supplier would have put the
supplier on notice as to the nature of the lessee's business, and thus
made the consequential damages foreseeable. Moreover, the lessee
could argue that the "benefit" of timely delivery to the lessee differs
from that to the lessor. It is the value of such timely delivery to the
lessee, not merely the monetary value of timely delivery to the lessor,
that a supplier should consider in setting a price with the lessor,
and, which, in turn, would have been reflected in the rental terms of
the lease.
Provided the supplier is made aware of the lessee's expectations
during negotiation of the equipment specifications, the lessee
should prevail on a claim for consequential damages. The lessee,
however, would be advised not to leave this matter to chance.
Rather than relying on interpretation of the "benefit" language in
section 2A-209(1), the lessee should seek to ensure that its potential
consequential damages are not cut off. First, the supply contract,
under which the lessee is made a beneficiary through the operation
of section 2A-209(1), could explicitly provide for protection against
consequential damages; this would protect the lessor as well. Alter-
103 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104 This assumes the liquidated damages clause in the supply contract was not void
as a penalty or as unreasonable. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1991) (if supply contract was
sale); id. § 2A-504(l) (if supply contract was lease).
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natively, the lessee could make a separate agreement with the sup-
plier to provide for consequential damages in case of the supplier's
breach of the supply contract. The possibility for such an agree-
ment is raised in section 2A-209(4), 10 5 which states that the opera-
tion of section 2A-209(1), making the lessee a beneficiary of the
supply contract, would have no effect on the lessee's rights under an
independent agreement.
C. Effect of Supply Contract Modification
Finally, there is the effect of the modification of the supply con-
tract, and the role played by section 2A-209(3) in ensuring that the
lessee's rights are not cut off. Recall that section 2A-209(3) denies
the effect of "modification or rescission" of the supply contract
against the lessee on two occasions. If the supplier has notice that
the lessee has entered into a "related" lease contract, the modifica-
tion or rescission is ineffective against the lessee. However, if the
supplier has not yet received such notice, the second sentence of
section 2A-209(3) allows the modification or rescission to become
"effective." Though section 2A-209(3) allows the lessee's position
as beneficiary of the supply contract10 6 to be altered by modification
or rescission of the supply contract between the supplier and lessor,
it requires that the lessor extend to the lessee the promises or war-
ranties of the supply contract "that were so modified or rescinded as
they existed and were available to the lessee before modification or
rescission." 107
This last sentence protects the lessee's legitimate expectations
of its rights as a beneficiary under the supply contract. However, in
a finance lease, the lessee is the party responsible for selecting the
goods, and the task of negotiating warranties falls on the lessee, not
the lessor. The nature of the protection embodied in section 2A-
209(3), however, opens the door to a serious defeat of the lessee's
expectations.
Consider the following sequence of events. The lessee again
negotiates over the specification and selection of a large piece of
equipment critical to its manufacturing. The supplier now ap-
proaches a finance lessor-perhaps one with which it has had prior
dealings-to arrange financing. They enter into a supply contract,
one incorporating the specifications and warranties previously nego-
tiated by the supplier and lessee-to-be.
Now recall that in order for a lease to qualify as a statutory fi-
nance lease, the lessee must be given the opportunity to learn of the
105 For the text of § 2A-209(4), see supra note 16.
106 U.C.C. § 2A-209(1) (1991).
107 Id. § 2A-209(3).
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supplier's promises and warranties to the lessor made in the supply
contract: one of four events must occur under section 2A-
103(1)(g)(iii).'10s Suppose further that of those four possibilities, the
parties choose the option whereby the lessee receives a statement
from the lessor of the promises and warranties in the supply con-
tract. 10 9 Suppose further that after the parties furnish this state-
ment to the lessee, the lessor and supplier modify a warranty: this
could occur, for example, if the lessor owed the supplier an out-
standing debt from a prior transaction, and some warranty protec-
tion was exchanged for its discharge. At some point after this
modification, the lessee signs the lease and notifies the supplier that
it has entered a finance lease.
In this scenario, what are the consequences for the parties? Ac-
cording to section 2A-209(3), the modification is effective against
the lessee, having occurred before the supplier received notice of
the lessee's entry into the finance lease. However, the lessor must
step in and assume the warranty obligation as it existed prior to the
modification.
This gives the lessee greater protection than it would have
under the Restatement which allows the supplier and lessor (as prom-
isor and promisee) to modify the promisor's duty to the beneficiary
up to the point of the lessee's material reliance on the promise-
that is, when the lessee signs the lease. In giving greater protection
to the lessee, Article 2A implicitly recognizes the nature of the
lessee's role here as a party paying, through the lease instrument,
for the warranty protection.
However, suppose that at the time the lessee signed the lease,
the modification has not yet occurred. Here the Restatement would
terminate the power of the supplier and lessor to modify the sup-
plier's duty, if the lessee's signing is viewed as material reliance.
Under section 2A-209(3), however, the supplier and lessor could
still modify the warranty, up to such time as the supplier is notified
of the finance lease; if they did so, the lessor would still have to
assume the modified obligation.
Despite the protection given the lessee's warranty rights by
forcing the lessor to assume them in case of modification of the sup-
ply contract, section 2A-209(3) could still fall short of ensuring the
lessee the full benefit of its bargain. First, there is no assurance that
the lessee will know of the modification before it attempts to enforce
its warranty rights, since section 2A-103(l)(g)(iii) does not require
108 See supra text accompanying note 12.
109 Sections 2A-103(1)(g)(iii)(C) and (D) were both added in the 1990 amendments
to Article 2A. Formerly, the lessee was required to see the actual supply contract "evi-
dencing the lessor's purchase .. " U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g)(iii) (1987).
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that modifications of the supply contract be communicated to the
lessee subsequent to its initial receipt of a statement of the promises
and warranties. Second, a significant difference may exist in the
quality of performance under the modified warranty when, for ex-
ample, the lessor is called upon to perform, rather than the supplier
(which may be a manufacturer with unique expertise).
As with the previous hypothetical cases, the best course for the
lessee is to address the problems expressly during negotiations.
The lessee should insist on a current statement of the supply con-
tract's promises and warranties immediately before entering into
the lease, and give notice immediately to the supplier in order to
terminate the power of the supplier and lessor to modify the supply
contract.
The question remains, however, of what remedy might be avail-
able to the lessee should it learn of a subsequent modification in
circumstances where the lessor, who by operation of section 2A-
209(3) has assumed the modified warranty, is unable to provide ade-
quate service. Would the lessee have rights against the lessor?
Recall that the lessee's obligation to pay rent would be binding
under the hell or high water clause of section 2A-407. However,
because the lessor, upon agreement to modify the supply contract,
is deemed to assume the warranty obligations, 110 the lessee may
now have a claim for breach of an express warranty against the les-
sor, I I one of the limited number of claims to which the hell or high
water clause is vulnerable.11 2 Since section 2A-210(l)(a) includes in
the definition of an express warranty any "promise made by the les-
110 Id § 2A-209(3).
111 Express warranties are governed by section 2A-210, which reads in full:
Express Warranties
(1) Express warranties by the lessor are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the lessor to the
lessee which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods will conform to
the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods will conform
to the description.
(c) Any sample or model that is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods will conform
to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
lessor use formal words, such as "warrant" or "guarantee," or that the
lessor have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely
the lessor's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.
Id. § 2A-210.
112 Id § 2A-209 official cmt.
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sor to the lessee which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain,"' 113 and since the lessor is now, by operation of
law, making to the lessee a promise previously made by the supplier,
the lessor has arguably taken on a new, express warranty. In addition,
an express warranty will be made whether or not the lessor actually
"intends" it: following the model of section 2-313(2), section 2A-
210(2) explicitly states that "[it is not necessary to the creation of
an express warranty ... that the lessor have a specific intention to
make a warranty." ' 1 4 Under such an express warranty, the lessee, to
the extent that the value of the warranty to the lessee has been re-
duced, would be able to offset its rental obligation, which is no
longer "irrevocable and independent" under section 2A-407.
CONCLUSION
Article 2A goes a long way to bring personal property leasing
under a uniform regime. In both general provisions and the many
exceptions to the general leasing rules, it addresses several of the
most difficult issues in the area of finance leases: the scope of the
substantive rights of the lessee as beneficiary of the supply contract,
the nature of the lessee's obligation to pay rent, and the issue of
modification of the supply contract both before and after the finance
lease becomes effective.
In each of these areas there remain unresolved issues-issues
which arise because the relationship between the parties in a finance
lease arrangement is not completely specified, and the integration of
Article 2A with existing remedy provisions of Article 2 is unclear.
The nature of the "benefit" extended to the lessee by operation of
section 2A-209 is the chief problem that emerges from close analysis
of the statute. The scope of rights against a supplier that flow to the
lessee as a result of the beneficiary status under the supply contract
remains unacceptably confused in a statute whose express purpose
is to bring clarity to the limbo-land of personal-property leasing
under the common law. Similarly, the apparent equation of lessor
and lessee, with respect to the supplier, opens the door to an overly
formal reading of 2A-209 in the area of remedies. Finally, the provi-
sions regarding contract modification, and specifically what avenue
is open to a lessee who discovers a change in the identity of a war-
ranty provider-potentially after relying on the supplier to be stand-
ing ready-is disturbing. Article 2A remains unclear on whether
warranties "deemed" to be assumed by a lessor under section 2A-
209(3) become express warranties, and thus actionable by a lessee.
113 Id. § 2A-210(1)(a).
114 Id. § 2A-210(2).
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While such matters are ideally dealt with in the statutory text,
without further amendment of Article 2A, these problems await res-
olution by the courts. In the absence of such judicial emendation,
parties to finance leases, increasingly subject to Article 2A in future
years, would be wise to contract around those areas of the statute
where the text lacks the clarity to offer predictive value.
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